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RESPONSE OF APPELLEE PUTVIN 
TO APPELLANT THOMPSON'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondent John C. Putvin, through counsel, comes now and responds to and 
opposes Appellant Karen Thompson's Petition for Rehearing ol the Court's June 8,1994 ruling 
(see, Putvin v. Thompson, 241 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (CA June 8,1994) in this custody matter as 
follows: 
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III. ARGUMENT 
1. The Court was well advised and decided the case intelligently. The parties 
briefed the matter very extensively, and argued it vigorously at hearing. The Court posed 
numerous searching questions, and the opinion as written illustrates that the judges were able 
to cut through the numerous side issues and irrelevancies, and hone in on the few narrow 
issues which were material. 
Most of the Court's opinion is a thorough recitation of the facts and circumstances 
constituting this long, difficult case. The decision carefully catalogs paragraph upon 
paragraph of salient facts, all supported by the record and accurate in every material respect. 
Certainly the Court has a better grasp of the facts and procedural history than is reflected in 
the Petition forRehearing'(or Thompson's briefs for that matter). 
As the Court correctly found, Thompson's appeal is an assault on a custody award that 
is beyond attack, both legally and factually. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
Custody Decree were entered by the trial court only after Karen's counsel agreed to them 
and approved them by his signature in November, 1991. Even if the time period within which 
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she could have asked the court to consider setting aside the judgment had not already 
passed, her actions and those of her attorney waived any defect she might have otherwise 
claimed. 
2. Thompson's argument about timeliness has no place here. Yet this is her first 
line of attack. She argues that her Rule 59 motion was timely "served" while admitting it was 
not filed until two days late.1 Even if it were assumed that Thompson is correct, this whole 
argument is a painfully immaterial question, and not nearly good enough to justify a Rule 35, 
Utah R. App. Proc. Petition. 
Thompson is not candid with the Court. She writes her Petition as if she had lost her 
appeal based on untimeliness. One need only read the four reasons stated in the Conclusion 
to see that timeliness was not in any way a basis for the Court's affirmance of the trial 
court. 241 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. Rather than trample upon Thompson for her untimeliness, 
the Court excused it, overlooking this obstacle and affirming instead on the merits. 
The "newly discovered evidence" could have been raised pursuant to either 
Rule 59 or Rule 60. Because Thompson filed the motion after the ten days 
allowed by Rule 59, but within the three months allowed by Rule 60, the 
motion was timely only if it is properly regarded as a Rule 60 motion. Without 
1
 In addition to the other timeliness problems, it should be 
remembered that the appeal is really an attack on the Decree and how 
it came about. Yet the Appeal was filed June 2, 1993, 30 months 
after the Decree and 3 months after the order denying the attack on 
the Decree. R. 1504-1505. 
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definitely deciding, we will treat the motion as one made pursuant to 
Rule 60 for purposes of this appeal. 
241 Utah Ad v Rep at 16 II le very' next sentence of the decision begins with, 
In reaching the merits of the appeal we emphasize its scope: to consider 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside its prior 
order denying a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment. 
Id. The standard of review then became abuse of discretion, as correctly noted by the Court. 
Id Thompson has now again failed miserably in showing such abuse. 
Thompson tries in her Petition to case the Court's decision as though it considered 
only the merits of her appeal under Rule 59, URCP. This is not at all true. "Darger had all the 
'newly discovered evidence1 well before the disposition of Thompson's first [Rule 60(b)] 
motion for relief " 241 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. 
The appeal and motions were, indeed, untimely. Thompson was most 
In I'liui kin ' »l ii.ii 11 it, .AH ii mi weiii on to discuss the merits instead of dismissing the appeal on 
technical grounds. The appeal should have been filed within thirty days after the date of entry 
of the order appealed from. Rule 4(a), Utah R. App. P. The appeal here is actually a 
challenge to the November, 1991 Custody Decree. As such, it is 2 years late. Karen's 
attempt to extend the appeal time by filing a Motion to Alter or Amendris transparent, and 
does not restore jurisdiction that was lost. 
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If Karen had misgivings about the Findings, Conclusions and Custody Decree, or 
claimed her attorney had wronged her, she should have moved within 10 days for new or 
amended findings or order back in 1991. URCP 52(b). Absent that, she could have timely 
appealed, but did neither. Her appeal came years after the custody award, months after the 
"new" evidence was known to Karen. Although it was filed within 30 days of denial of the 
Motion to Alter or Amend, that motion was filed 13 days after the order it seeks to reverse. 
"An untimely motion for a new trial has no effect on the running of the time for filing a notice 
of appeal." Burgers v. Maiben% 652 P.2d 1320,1321 (Utah 1982); Vanjora v. Draper 30 Utah 2d 
364, 517 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1974). 
The motion to alter or amend was really a motion to reconsider. But such a document 
is not found in the rules, and does not extend the time for appeal under Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4. The appeal came 83 days after the order appealed from, and 16 
months after the decree. 
4. Use of Rule 60(b) does not make her appeal timely. Two layers of time 
restrictions are placed upon a party seeking relief under Rule 60(b). The motion must be 
brought "within a reasonable time" and, where applicable, "not more than 3 months" after the 
order. URCP 60(b). Thompson filed her 60(b) motion May 26,1992, some six months after 
the Decree. Then she failed to get an order on the motion until March 11,1993. 
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Since she comes well outside the three month limit, she must establish that her motion 
was brought within a "reasonable time". That test is a genuine limit on relief from domestic 
decrees for "other reason[s] justifying relief". McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200,494 P.2d 
283(1972). 
5. The evidence was not "newly discovered". After incorrectly acting as though the 
Court had erroneously locked the courthouse doors to her due to untimeliness, Thompson 
then goes on in her second point to argue that this "misapprehension of law" by the Court 
means the evidence was newly discovered and noncumulative. But the Court's decision 
already carefully considered those matters, and found that Judge Hansen did not abuse his 
discretion. 
The Court correctly pointed out that the "new" evidence, Kimball's changed position 
on whether he was Thompson's attomey when he stipulated on her behalf, was known by the 
parties at least as early as November 18,1992. 
6. The evidence was cumulative. In fact, there was nothing new at all. The Rule 
60(b) motion and Rule 59 motion were both based merely on a retrospective change of heart 
by Thompson's former attorney. This change of heart was known in early 1992, and during 
the five day evidentiary hearing in the summer of 1992. Kimball's April, 1993 affidavit was 
nothing but a repeat of what had by then been argued by Thompson's side for over a year. 
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It was a new look at what Kimball himself had done and knew he had done on Thompson's 
behalf some fifteen months earlier. 241 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. 
In fact, while Kimball says on and off that he may not have been authorized to allow 
a default or stipulated custody award to Putvin, the Court correctly notes that 
the November 4, 1991 letter speaks for itself. It reveals Thompson's decision, 
which Kimball undertook to implement, to end the custody litigation as soon 
as possible: "I will no longer fight with you to try and win custody. There is no 
reason to continue this battle in the courts I hope that you will have the 
decency to be satisfied now that you have full custody." 
241 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. Likewise, the Court notes the obvious: 
Kimball and Thompson's claim that Kimball acted without authority is 
contradicted by the fact that Thompson continued to use Kimball's services and 
to appear with him in court well after she now claims she discharged him.2 
Id. Thompson not only fails to show that Judge Hansen abused his discretion in not allowing 
her capricious flip flops to define justice and rule the day. The indefensibility of her position 
makes it highly likely that a granting of her post judgment motions would have been an abuse 
of discretion. 
7. Thompson does not begin to qualify under the "newly discovered evidence" 
requirements of either Rule 60 or Rule 59, URCP. To prevail she must (but cannot): 
* Show the evidence is material and competent UniversalInv. Co. v. Carpets, Inc., 
16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P.2d 564 (1965); 
2
 In fact, on January 31, 1992 Kimball told the Court under 
oath that he never stopped being Karen's attorney. 
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* Demonstrate that it is truly newly discovered Id.; 
* Show that it could not have been found and presented at trial, Kettner v. Snow, 
13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (Utah 1962); 
* Demonstrate that the evidence is not incidental or cumulative of evidence 
already presented, Universal supra; 
* Show that the evidence has substance, sufficient that it would reasonably have 
resulted in a different outcome, Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122,247 P.2d 264 (Utah 1952). 
8. The constitutional arguments are not applicable. Thompson argues that 
somehow the fact that the Court did not indulge itself in each and every aspect of her legal 
theory deprives her of some right under Article I, Section 11 of Utah's Constitution. Of course 
it is commonplace for the Court to by-pass issues that are meritless without lengthy 
discussion, especially when there are other independent bases for affirmance, which make 
the many other arguments and sub-points immaterial. That is all that occurred here. 
A losing party cannot use a petition for rehearing "to present to this court a 
new theory or contention which was neither in the record as it was before this 
court or in the arguments made." Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485,498, 170 P. 774, 
778 (Utah 1918). 
LockhartCo. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678,681 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted). 
9. Attorney fees should be imposed. Where an appeal is brought from an action 
that was properly determined by the trial court to be in bad faith, the appeals court must 
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necessarily find the appeal to be frivolous under Rule 33, Utah R. App. P. Utah Dept of Sod 
Services v. Adams, 806 P. 2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991). 
Here the Court's decision makes it clear that Thompson's appeal position is baseless, 
and that the Court had several independent reasons for affirming Judge Hanson. 
We find no abuse of discretion in the court's denying Thompson's second 
motion for relief because (1) Darger had all the "newly discovered evidence" 
well before the disposition of Thompson's first motion for relief and well within 
the ten-day period for Rule 59 relief; (2) the newly discovered evidence" was 
not newly discovered; (3) the "newly discovered evidence" was merely 
cumulative; and (4) the November 11,1991 letter does not purport to discharge 
Kimball, but on the contrary, memorializes her decision to withdraw from the 
dispute, which decision Kimball set about to implement. 
To now petition, without even attempting to show an error in each of these four, independent 
bases, that the whole thing be heard again, makes an attorney fee award appropriate. If they 
are not awarded for the entire appeal, then they should be at least for this response. See, 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987).3 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Petition must clearly be denied, and some message sent to Thompson to end the 
bleak house of litigation. She must be made to understand that her only means of attack on 
3
 John moves for an award of double costs and attorney fees 
on appeal. Rule 33, Utah R. App. P. 
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the subject stipulated custody Decree is through the showing of some substantial change of 
material circumstances. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of 4ai}u**yrr994. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IV. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I Mitchell Barker, certify that on this 10th day of July, 19941 served two copies of the 
attached Appellee's Response to Appellant's Petition for£ehearingupon Daniel Darger, Esq., 
counsel for the appellant in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient 
postage prepaid, to the following address: 
Daniel Darger, Esq., 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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